American Manufacturing of Vape Components Would be a Big Win for National Security

America has spent decades allowing the manufacturing of electronic components to migrate overseas. The consequences are usually discussed in terms of lost jobs, weakened supply chains, and dependence on foreign manufacturers. But another consequence deserves far more attention: national security.

Consider something as seemingly harmless as a disposable vape.

Modern vaping devices can contain microprocessors, rechargeable batteries, USB connections, digital displays, and, in some cases, Bluetooth or other wireless capabilities. Cybersecurity researchers have demonstrated that vaping devices can be reverse-engineered and interacted with electronically. Devices equipped with Bluetooth or Wi-Fi present additional possibilities because they can communicate with other devices and potentially transmit information.

That has attracted attention in Washington.

A group of U.S. senators recently warned the administration about the national-security implications of Chinese-made vaping products, arguing that connected devices could potentially collect sensitive information, facilitate data breaches or create opportunities for malware. Their concerns are particularly significant because China dominates the manufacturing of vaping hardware entering the United States.

The concern reflects a much broader security principle already practiced throughout government: untrusted electronic devices do not belong around classified information.

Secure Compartmented Information Facilities, commonly known as SCIFs, operate under strict controls on electronic devices. Similar restrictions exist throughout intelligence agencies and classified government environments. The logic is straightforward. Anything containing electronics, communications capability or data-storage technology can create a potential vulnerability.

Federal courthouses provide another example. Policies vary by district, but some explicitly prohibit vaping devices from being brought inside. One current federal court order specifically lists “vapes” and “e-cigarettes” among prohibited courthouse items, alongside restrictions on devices capable of capturing, transmitting or storing information.

The lesson extends far beyond vaping.

America increasingly surrounds itself with inexpensive electronics manufactured thousands of miles away: cameras, sensors, chargers, communications equipment, vehicle components, smart appliances and countless circuit boards embedded in everyday products. Each represents another piece of the nation's technological infrastructure that Americans often did not manufacture and whose supply chain they may not fully control.

The solution should be obvious: make more of these components in America.

A vaping device actually illustrates how achievable that could be. These are not advanced fighter-jet avionics or cutting-edge semiconductor fabrication systems. Many of their electronic assemblies are relatively straightforward consumer electronics. American companies have the technical ability to manufacture and assemble them domestically.

The obstacle is often economic and regulatory.

Federal vaping regulations have created an extraordinarily difficult pathway for manufacturers attempting to legally introduce new products. The result is a bitter irony: Washington worries about potentially vulnerable Chinese-made electronic devices while the regulatory environment can make it prohibitively expensive for American businesses to develop and manufacture competing products domestically.

National security policy and industrial policy need to start working together.

When government identifies foreign-made electronics as a potential security vulnerability, it should simultaneously ask what prevents those products and components from being manufactured safely in the United States.

America cannot regulate its way out of dependence on foreign manufacturing while making domestic manufacturing commercially impossible.

Bringing electronic manufacturing home means American jobs, stronger supply chains and greater control over the technology surrounding us. More importantly, it means reducing vulnerabilities created when critical—and even seemingly insignificant—electronic devices originate in supply chains controlled by strategic competitors.

If something as ordinary as a vape can raise concerns inside America's most secure buildings, we should be asking a much bigger question:

What else are we importing that we should be making ourselves?